'Lion of Panjshir' dies
By Anthony Davis
11 September 2001The leader of Afghanistan's anti-Taliban opposition, Ahmadshah Massoud, was mortally wounded by suicide bombers on 9 September, dying within minutes of the blast according to intelligence sources who spoke to Jane's Intelligence Review.
Ending a tumultuous 22 year military career battling Afghan and Soviet communists, mujahideen rivals and since 1995 the Pakistan-backed Taliban, his death throws the opposition United Front (UF) into disarray and will have a major impact on the future of the conflict.
The attack at Massoud's Khwaja Bahauddin headquarters on the Tajikistan border was carried out by two Arabs posing as journalists. During an interview in the Afghan chief's office one detonated a bomb concealed in a video camera.
Both Arabs died in the attack along with Massoud and a spokesman-interpreter, Assem Suhail. The blast badly wounded the Afghan ambassador to India, Massoud Khalili, who was also present, and a Foreign Ministry official.
The assassins are understood to have been Algerians affiliated to the al-Qaeda organisation of indicted Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden, a major supporter and financier of the Afghan Taliban. Based in southern Afghanistan and reputedly close to Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, bin Laden commands some 2,000- 3,000 Arab followers fighting in Taliban ranks and runs several training facilities.
The two bombers reportedly travelled from Europe where, according to their cover story, they worked for an organisation called "Arab News International". Having arrived in Pakistan they travelled first to Kabul - where they are presumed to have picked up the camera-bomb - before journeying north into opposition controlled areas. Unclear, however, is how they were able to cross the lines north of Kabul - evidently with the permission of the Taliban military - without arousing the suspicion of UF authorities. Foreign journalists covering Opposition zones in the northeast invariably travel by air either on a UN flight from Pakistan or by UF military helicopter from Tajikistan.
Any suspicions were apparently allayed, however, by two apparently normal interviews with Burhanuddin Rabbani, titular president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) and Abdur-rab Sayyaf, a former mujahideen faction leader with longstanding Arab connections who has been allied with Rabbani and Massoud.
Massoud's death has been followed by a desperate cover-up effort by UF spokesmen and senior diplomats who have insisted Massoud was only wounded and - depending on differing accounts - was in hospital either in Khwaja Bahauddin or nearby Tajikistan. The cover-up appears to have been aimed at preventing panic in UF ranks as well as at winning time in order to fill the yawning leadership vacuum.
Given Massoud's legendary stature and military experience this will be an impossible task. His role has combined charismatic military strongman with astute political leader, winning him immense popularity among his ethnic Tajik minority as well as considerable international recognition. Since the mid-1980s he overshadowed his political mentor Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former theology professor and head of the Jamiat-i-Islami party which Massoud joined in 1973. Significantly it was Massoud who earlier this year made a high-profile visit to Europe - not the older softer-spoken Rabbani who remains Afghanistan's UN-recognised president.
Militarily, the man who will attempt the task of filling Massoud's place will be Commander Fahim who in recent years has served as Massoud's second in command and security and intelligence chief. Like Massoud an ethnic Tajik from the Panjshir Valley, Fahim, now in his early fifties, first joined a 1979 anti-communist uprising in the Panjshir led by Massoud; and has fought alongside him ever since. Most recently he has been based near the frontlines in the Keshm area.
While seen as a competent and reliable military commander, the self-effacing Fahim has none of the personal charisma, strategic vision and political sense that over the years underpinned Massoud's unchallenged leadership. In an already fractious alliance, this lack of stature will undoubtedly complicate his relations with other major UF commanders, notably the Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostam, Massoud's western ally Ismael Khan, and the Shia leaders of central Afghanistan.
Subordinate to Fahim (and unlikely to challenge his command) are two younger regional commanders both in their thirties: Daoud Khan a Tajik from Takhar province who earlier served as Massoud's aide-de-camp and today commands troops in the crucial Farkhar sector of the northeastern frontline; and Bismillah Khan, a tough Panjshiri commanding forces in Shomali, north of Kabul.
Politically, Rabbani is likely to remain as overall figurehead but real executive power will fall to two men, both close to Massoud in recent years - Yunus Qanuni and the ISA's acting foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah. A Panjshiri Tajik, Qanuni has acted as a political trouble-shooter and negotiator for Massoud both inside Afghanistan and beyond. Abdullah, a former medical doctor, has been close to Massoud since joining him in the Panjshir in 1984. An urbane and polished English speaker, without personal political ambition, he has in recent years served as UF diplomatic point-man internationally. Both men have tended to defer to Massoud and neither have the military reputation essential for a leadership role in today's Afghanistan.
To this group will fall the task of holding together the force of some 12,000 - 15,000 troops defending the UF's northeast enclave which comprises essentially Badakhshan province, the Panjshir valley and part of the Shomali plain north of Kabul. Officials from concerned external supporters of the UF - Russia, Iran, Tajkistan and India - were due to meet in Dushanbe on 11 September in an effort to assess the situation. Some analysts believe an immediate increase in materiel may be forthcoming as these states scramble to shore up the now leaderless UF.
That said, morale rather than fresh hardware will constitute the decisive element in the coming weeks, and on the Afghan battlefield, the loss of a charismatic commander is more likely to breed despair and defeatism than to stiffen resolve to fight on. If, as seems likely, the Taliban leadership was privy to plans for the assassination, a renewed militia offensive could well unfold in the near future as the UF grapples with the loss of its leader and before the onset of winter in November. A minimum objective would probably be the seizure of Faizabad, Badakhshan's provincial centre, severing UF logistic links with Tajikistan and leaving the Panjshir valley isolated and leaderless over the bitter Afghan winter.
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Ahmad Shah Massoud was a world class leader and an excellent commander. The man was loved and respected by his people.
We thank Allah for such a precious gift he had blessed us with, and we shall behold his legend dear to us until the end of time.
On September 9th, Commander Massoud was severely injured in a suicide bombing carried out by two Arab terrorists posing as journalists. After a few days in comma, on September 14th, 2001, at age 48, dear Massoud reached martyrdom.
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'Lion of Panjshir' dies
By Anthony Davis
11 September 2001The leader of Afghanistan's anti-Taliban opposition, Ahmadshah Massoud, was mortally wounded by suicide bombers on 9 September, dying within minutes of the blast according to intelligence sources who spoke to Jane's Intelligence Review.
Ending a tumultuous 22 year military career battling Afghan and Soviet communists, mujahideen rivals and since 1995 the Pakistan-backed Taliban, his death throws the opposition United Front (UF) into disarray and will have a major impact on the future of the conflict.
The attack at Massoud's Khwaja Bahauddin headquarters on the Tajikistan border was carried out by two Arabs posing as journalists. During an interview in the Afghan chief's office one detonated a bomb concealed in a video camera.
Both Arabs died in the attack along with Massoud and a spokesman-interpreter, Assem Suhail. The blast badly wounded the Afghan ambassador to India, Massoud Khalili, who was also present, and a Foreign Ministry official.
The assassins are understood to have been Algerians affiliated to the al-Qaeda organisation of indicted Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden, a major supporter and financier of the Afghan Taliban. Based in southern Afghanistan and reputedly close to Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, bin Laden commands some 2,000- 3,000 Arab followers fighting in Taliban ranks and runs several training facilities.
The two bombers reportedly travelled from Europe where, according to their cover story, they worked for an organisation called "Arab News International". Having arrived in Pakistan they travelled first to Kabul - where they are presumed to have picked up the camera-bomb - before journeying north into opposition controlled areas. Unclear, however, is how they were able to cross the lines north of Kabul - evidently with the permission of the Taliban military - without arousing the suspicion of UF authorities. Foreign journalists covering Opposition zones in the northeast invariably travel by air either on a UN flight from Pakistan or by UF military helicopter from Tajikistan.
Any suspicions were apparently allayed, however, by two apparently normal interviews with Burhanuddin Rabbani, titular president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) and Abdur-rab Sayyaf, a former mujahideen faction leader with longstanding Arab connections who has been allied with Rabbani and Massoud.
Massoud's death has been followed by a desperate cover-up effort by UF spokesmen and senior diplomats who have insisted Massoud was only wounded and - depending on differing accounts - was in hospital either in Khwaja Bahauddin or nearby Tajikistan. The cover-up appears to have been aimed at preventing panic in UF ranks as well as at winning time in order to fill the yawning leadership vacuum.
Given Massoud's legendary stature and military experience this will be an impossible task. His role has combined charismatic military strongman with astute political leader, winning him immense popularity among his ethnic Tajik minority as well as considerable international recognition. Since the mid-1980s he overshadowed his political mentor Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former theology professor and head of the Jamiat-i-Islami party which Massoud joined in 1973. Significantly it was Massoud who earlier this year made a high-profile visit to Europe - not the older softer-spoken Rabbani who remains Afghanistan's UN-recognised president.
Militarily, the man who will attempt the task of filling Massoud's place will be Commander Fahim who in recent years has served as Massoud's second in command and security and intelligence chief. Like Massoud an ethnic Tajik from the Panjshir Valley, Fahim, now in his early fifties, first joined a 1979 anti-communist uprising in the Panjshir led by Massoud; and has fought alongside him ever since. Most recently he has been based near the frontlines in the Keshm area.
While seen as a competent and reliable military commander, the self-effacing Fahim has none of the personal charisma, strategic vision and political sense that over the years underpinned Massoud's unchallenged leadership. In an already fractious alliance, this lack of stature will undoubtedly complicate his relations with other major UF commanders, notably the Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostam, Massoud's western ally Ismael Khan, and the Shia leaders of central Afghanistan.
Subordinate to Fahim (and unlikely to challenge his command) are two younger regional commanders both in their thirties: Daoud Khan a Tajik from Takhar province who earlier served as Massoud's aide-de-camp and today commands troops in the crucial Farkhar sector of the northeastern frontline; and Bismillah Khan, a tough Panjshiri commanding forces in Shomali, north of Kabul.
Politically, Rabbani is likely to remain as overall figurehead but real executive power will fall to two men, both close to Massoud in recent years - Yunus Qanuni and the ISA's acting foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah. A Panjshiri Tajik, Qanuni has acted as a political trouble-shooter and negotiator for Massoud both inside Afghanistan and beyond. Abdullah, a former medical doctor, has been close to Massoud since joining him in the Panjshir in 1984. An urbane and polished English speaker, without personal political ambition, he has in recent years served as UF diplomatic point-man internationally. Both men have tended to defer to Massoud and neither have the military reputation essential for a leadership role in today's Afghanistan.
To this group will fall the task of holding together the force of some 12,000 - 15,000 troops defending the UF's northeast enclave which comprises essentially Badakhshan province, the Panjshir valley and part of the Shomali plain north of Kabul. Officials from concerned external supporters of the UF - Russia, Iran, Tajkistan and India - were due to meet in Dushanbe on 11 September in an effort to assess the situation. Some analysts believe an immediate increase in materiel may be forthcoming as these states scramble to shore up the now leaderless UF.
That said, morale rather than fresh hardware will constitute the decisive element in the coming weeks, and on the Afghan battlefield, the loss of a charismatic commander is more likely to breed despair and defeatism than to stiffen resolve to fight on. If, as seems likely, the Taliban leadership was privy to plans for the assassination, a renewed militia offensive could well unfold in the near future as the UF grapples with the loss of its leader and before the onset of winter in November. A minimum objective would probably be the seizure of Faizabad, Badakhshan's provincial centre, severing UF logistic links with Tajikistan and leaving the Panjshir valley isolated and leaderless over the bitter Afghan winter.
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Two months back we featured a photo essay called “Life in Afghanistan” by English photographer Jason Florio (Vol. 8 No. 6 - The Photo Issue). Five images that could have just as easily been called “Hell on Earth,” these pictures showed us what Afghanistan really is. A pile of rubble. Dire circumstances, the plight of refugee camps and hopeful girls studying in underground schools, his shots depicted the consequences of war, the by-product of international neglect and the despotism of religious zealots.
The photos had been hidden in the ceiling of a Kabul hotel room and, after Florio was detained by the Taliban’s Ministry of Vice and Virtue, they were smuggled out of Afghanistan and eventually landed in our hands.
Three days after submitting the photos Florio went back to Afghanistan because, as he so ominously put it, “it’s a critical time.” Attempting to sneak into the country on horseback (and dressed as a woman, no less), Florio was refused entry and had to resort to the easy way in: taking a UN flight from Karachi in the South of Pakistan to Tajikistan, getting a visa from the rebel embassy of the Northern Alliance, and then hiring a Russian helicopter to take him in. The mission on this second journey was to meet Afghanistan’s master of guerrilla warfare, General Ahmad Shah Masoud, AKA the Lion of Panjshir, bin Laden’s worst enemy.
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From left to right: An Afghan T-shirt made before the attack that praises bin Laden as a “world hero.” The photographer ID that enabled Florio to visit Northern Alliance POW camps and army bases. A visa to enter the Northern Alliance-occupied section of Afghanistan. A visa to enter the Taliban-occupied part. | “He started waging war with just 20 men, 10 Kalashnikovs, one machine gun and two rocket launchers,” wrote Brazilian journalist Pepe Escobar, who accompanied Florio on his second trip back. “The intellectual arsenal was certainly deadlier: Mao, Che, Ho Chi Minh, revolutionary tactics adapted to the Afghan mind to rouse rural peasants. In more than two decades he defeated Afghan dictator Muhamad Daoud and then the mighty Red Army of the Soviet Union.”
In recent years Masoud and his Northern Alliance were the only hope for salvation in a country traumatized by the Taliban, the unelected ruling militia who spawned a reign of puritanical fanaticism and subjugation so profound it brought the Afghanis to their knees.
Florio succeeded in his mission and managed to talk to Masoud who, in the midst of commencing a massive offensive against the Taliban, was eager to talk about his plans for the country. It turned out to be one of his last interviews ever. Masoud was assassinated by Arab suicide bombers posing as journalists on September 9, 2001. The assassins had rigged up their cameras as bombs.
By the time of the assassination Florio was already back in New York, where he now lives. On the morning of September 11 he received a phone call from a French news agency telling him that two planes had crashed into the World Trade Center. He ran forty-odd blocks with his camera and got to the base of the towers, which were still standing when he arrived, and as he was composing his images the first tower disintegrated. Metal and glass began to shower down from 1300 feet above and he ran to the end of the block, escaping near death by tumbling down a stairwell into a subway station where an FBI officer and a transit authority employee pulled him into the token booth as the carnage continued to pour in.
The guys who killed Masoud in Afghanistan used the same suicide bombing methods as the hijackers who flew the planes in America. Jason is the only person in the world who was at the epicenters of both of these catastrophic events, masterminded (probably) by the same fiends.
“It’s really surreal that I’ve been in both places at very strategic times,” says Florio. “Especially because I’ve been a day late and a dollar short on just about everything my entire life.”
Now that America’s ripping the shit out of Afghanistan, we asked Jason to sit down and talk to us about the future of “Islam VS the West.”
VICE: How did you get into Afghanistan? Once we got the visas, we took a Russian military helicopter to the Panjshir Valley (where the Northern Alliance dominates) and it took about four hours. They’re big military helicopters that look old but they’re actually quite new. The funny thing was that there was a French delegation that included a writer and a female photographer from Elle magazine, and she was all about liberating the Afghan women and came in with about twenty kilos of Lancôme makeup.
Actually, there are a lot of western loonies in the Panjshir Valley. There was a completely war-torn Italian photographer named Marco and he was with this really young, posh English girl. They were supposedly doing stories on geological sites that had been left in Afghanistan but they kept finding him at the front line, or at the prison, so finally Masoud found out about him and had him politely ejected out of the country.
I guess there wasn’t too much in the way of partying in Aghanistan. Actually, while we were waiting to meet Masoud we got invited to a wedding. It was a real trip, hundreds of people, with the men and women separated. But they had these ongoing parties that were going on for a few days. Our friend said as long as the helicopter comes in then we got booze and stuff. All the Russian vodka was in these dirty old Evian water bottles. The vodka came in from Tajikistan and it looked like mineral water and then they had the local hash which was really nice.
Tell us about Masoud. It’s interesting because as far as the North goes he was the absolute man there. He was the Che Guevara of our time, really. It took us about a week to finally get an interview with him. He was very busy but also very accommodating to the Western media, especially with the French media more than anybody because he spoke French. Unfortunately his openness to the press is what got him killed.
He was very much the character you anticipated. He was a very good-looking guy, and he was always immaculately dressed and he spoke very eloquently. We had 45 minutes with him and it was during a big offensive. Different commanders were coming in during the interview and handing him bits of paper and notes of what was going on around the country but he was very much in control. Now he’s gone, so it’s going to be interesting to see who’s going to fill his shoes because there is no one that charismatic or that savvy to the Western press.
His death was an absolute psychological blow to anyone who believed in him. He drove around in a Land Cruiser with blacked-out windows, he wore $700 shoes, but he was a leader, a commander, not some ragtag guy. He had extensive libraries at his home and in his office, and I think he tried extremely hard to understand the mentality of the West and take as many of the good things as possible while keeping traditional Afghan life. It could have been a really interesting fusion.
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Left: Fighters for the Northern Alliance. The boy in the center is only 14. His entire family was killed by the Taliban and he says “I will fight to the death because I have nothing to lose.” Middle: Northern Alliance soldiers in an abandoned airport tower monitor Taliban discussions a kilometer away. Right: A boy plays soccer, with a tank in the distance. | What was Masoud really trying to achieve? His philosophy was to maintain the borders that had been created (the Northeast section of the country that he had established for the Northern Alliance). I think he really knew his limitations. He could have taken out half of Kabul if he wanted to with the stinger missiles they have lying around. But I don’t think the Northern Alliance would do that. Sure they got a few motherfuckers commanding, but they’re trying to alleviate the suffering, not create more of it.
Masoud’s goal was to make a democracy of the Northeastern section of the country. There were talks of actual elections and he kind of had a government together with ministers. It was a frail network of a government but it was kind of working, and they were trying to get schools built for the girls and he was even talking of building a university for the girls as well. He was quite progressive in that respect, but the area was still very traditional so there was only so far they could westernize, but education was the main thing. He dealt a lot with aid agencies, as far as bringing money in and it was good PR for him as well.
What were the main differences between the parts of Afghanistan run by the Northern Alliance and the Taliban-held regions? In the Taliban region, which is ninety percent of the country, there’s a lot of fear. They thought they had protectors, but the Taliban turned out to be villains. The women are basically closeted in their homes. I met with an Afghan aid worker who’d come up from Kabul and his wife had had a series of nervous breakdowns because she couldn’t leave the house and she couldn’t lead a normal life. They don’t know when someone is going to knock on the door. There were incidents when the men weren’t in their households and the Taliban were coming in with a knock on the door late at night, saying “We can hear the radio, we can hear music playing,” and they would round up all the women and children and lock them in a room and basically ransack the house, stealing everything, and no one was doing anything about it. They were using their supposed laws against music and TV to become thieves and robbers, which was completely the antithesis of why the Taliban came in the first place.
In the areas held by the Northern Alliance I think there was much less paranoia, both on my part and the other Westerners that were down there, and just the Afghanis in general. People are just a lot happier. They’re out and about and moving around. The women are still covered, but that’s just traditional Afghan culture. It’s not to do with anything set down by the Taliban at all.
These guys in the Panjshir were just much more liberal. Masoud had this thing while we were there where he went around and had all the cigarettes rounded up. And that was his big thing, because everyone was smoking in the Panjshir Valley. And it wasn’t because he thought it was anti-Islamic but he said that the people who could least afford it were smoking the most. We thought he’d gone off the deep end when we heard about these mountains of cigarettes being burned, but his philosophy was about preserving people’s money. He said you’ve got limited amounts of funds, so why waste it on cigarettes? Get food on the kids’ tables first. That’s why it’s disappointing. I mean, he’d been a bastard in his time as well but at least he was kind of a renaissance guy as far as that area goes.
How was he a bastard? During the time when his troops were in Kabul people said it was almost worse when Masoud’s groups of Mujahideen (freedom fighters) were there. There was a lot of raping, a lot of girls disappearing, a lot of murders.… He really didn’t have control over his guys. Basically Masoud and a couple of the Mujahideen groups, which were all vying for Kabul at the time, decimated the city amongst themselves. Supposedly when the Russians were there it was hardly touched. The damage was done to the city once the Russians left. Things regressed into a civil war and that’s when the Taliban emerged.
I think any of us would have seen the Taliban as a liberating force at the time. The myth behind how the Taliban started was that in Kandahar, which is now the Taliban stronghold in Southern Afghanistan, there were two girls who were being gang-raped by a bunch of guys, and Mullah Omar, their one-eyed Taliban leader, who was a teacher at the time, got all his students together and took these guys out.
During the Soviet occupation, didn’t Mullah Omar and Masoud fight side by side as Mujahideen? They’d all been working together in some sense. And after the occupation ended in ’89, all the Mujahideen started switching sides, and different groups merged while others fell apart. The Taliban absorbed a lot of the commanders, either by paying them off or killing them. One way or the other they pushed through the country because they had a lot of cash from Pakistan and the United States to help them and a lot of technical support from the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s CIA), which was basically the shadow player behind the Taliban.
What about the refugee situation? It’s really, really severe, and it’s getting much worse. On the Pakistan side it’s a bit more established. There’s a camp called Nazir’s Baag (Nazir’s Garden) but it’s the least garden-y place you’ve ever seen in your life. It’s been there for about twenty years and it started when people started pouring out during the Soviet occupation. It’s more like an Afghan town: There are about 70 000 people living there. They have a council, electricity, lots of mosques in the town. It was supposed to be bulldozed in September but it probably didn’t happen because of the current situation. But the newer camps are really dire. We went to one that had over 100 000 people, with people living under plastic, and it was 110 degrees when I was there. Limited water, limited food. They’re basically in complete limbo.
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Top row: photo editor at large Ryan McGinley and friends ride BMXs around Ground Zero the night of the attack. Bottom row: VICE co-founder Suroosh Alvi photographs cars the next morning. | How responsible is America for all of this? People on the ground that I spoke to, especially in the Taliban areas, their lives have become so harsh, they were very bitter and very disappointed that the Americans pulled out after the Soviets were defeated. It’s like having your mother and father taken away, in some way. You’re so reliant on them and then suddenly you’re just crawling on the ground. The Americans used Afghani blood to beat the Soviets and then left. It’s a shame really, because initially the Americans funded the Taliban because they thought these guys are going to clean up. Little did they know that it was going to become a Frankenstein for them and for Pakistan as well. I met a retired Pakistani MP who said that whatever we explode metaphorically in Afghanistan will blow back to Pakistan and that’s exactly what’s happening now, with the increase in fundamentalism in Pakistan. The mullahs are some of the most frightening people on earth. They’re highly listened to and they’re highly illiterate and by and large they’re highly stupid. They really don’t know the Qur’an.
Why do you think America was attacked? This has been the least asked question by the American media in the aftermath and I can’t help but think that no one wants to criticize America, their foreign policy, and all the blunders they’ve made over the years at a time like this. Yes, that’s right, and I think it’s been a buildup over time. Anyone that is seen as an oppressor, and to a lot of people around the world America is not like the godfather coming in and handing out cash, propping up governments and doing aid projects.... A lot of people see America as a modern-day colonial empire. Look at Palestine, and the rest of the Middle East, and the sanctions against Iraq. There are people who support the US but there are even more who are angry with the US for their support of Israel.
And look at Pakistan. The Pakistani fundamentalists see America as the ultimate pusher, pushing product, lifestyle, consumerism and pushing obscenity. They see that as a breakdown in their own culture. They don’t want to have these western influences on their society.
I think all these things come together. If you’re a young guy and all this stuff’s been fed to you, then you get wrapped in the fervor of it. It’s similar to the people here saying “Get bin Laden!” We all get wrapped up in the fervor of it. And having religion as a shield that you’re fighting for makes you feel like you’re fighting a satanic power. It makes you feel invincible.
Suroosh Alvi
Jason Florio’s “Life in Afghanistan” photos can be viewed by clicking here.
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September 2000
Last September, a former resistance fighter journeyed home to Afghanistan on assignment for National Geographic magazine.
It had been 12 years since native Afghan Mohammad Shuaib last set foot in his homeland. Despite keeping up with events in his country, made desolate by drought and more than 20 years of unrelenting war, he was not prepared for the desperate conditions he found when he returned with writer Edward Girardet to cover Afghanistan. “Things had changed a lot,” he says. “Women and children did not have proper clothing. Houses had been bombed, and more and more refugees were fleeing Taliban territory to get to the areas controlled by the Northern Alliance. Most people, especially the refugees, were living on nothing more than tea and a piece of bread each day. With winter coming, we were afraid they would not be able to survive in their makeshift tents.”
Afghanistan’s deterioration began in 1978 with a coup that led to the establishment of a pro-Soviet government. The following year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, prompting a 16-year-old Shuaib to leave school to join the resistance, training for three months under Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. “If I hadn’t joined, I might have ended up in jail or dead,” he says. “The Soviets captured a lot of my friends and put them to death in prison.” But ten years later, the tenacious Afghans drove out the defeated Soviet Army. “When they left, we thought that was the end of our responsibility,” Shuaib says, “so I went to the United States to continue my studies. Unfortunately, the situation in Afghanistan got worse.”
When the Soviets pulled out in 1989, they left a communist government in place. That government fell in 1992, and the mujahidin (holy warriors) factions entered Kabul. Political efforts to unite the groups failed, and within two months a government headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, with Massoud as its Defense Minister, took power. Massoud was unable to bring peace and the rival groups continued to fight, eventually destroying much of the city. Responding to the anarchy prevailing throughout the country, a group of former mujahidin organized in an effort to bring order to the warring nation. This group became the Taliban, and—with backing from such radical Muslims as Osama bin Laden—fought its way to Kabul and put an end to the battles, winning a measure of support from a relieved Afghan people.
The Taliban set a strict and harshly enforced standard of Islamic fundamentalism. Based on what some scholars consider a distorted interpretation of the Koran, it fosters a deep-seated aversion to Western ways and severely restricts women, denying them the right to work, to go to school, to receive decent medical care, and to appear in public without a male escort. Under Taliban law, women are subjected to severe punishment if their footsteps make noise, if they are not completely covered, or if they wear high heels or white socks—allegedly viewed as sexually alluring. “Women once played an active role in Afghanistan,” Shuaib says. “Without their help, we could not have continued fighting the Soviets. They are a part of society and should take part in it.”
Before his assassination, set in motion September 9 by two Arab suicide bombers posing as Moroccan journalists, Massoud led the Northern Alliance in a war against the Taliban. “Massoud was a kind and effective commander,” Shuaib says. “He was friendly with everyone. When he received the title of ‘General,'’ he told his followers to simply call him by his name.”
Just days before the assassination, Shuaib and Girardet came face to face with the killers, spending two nights in the room next to theirs at a Northern Alliance guesthouse. Their guarded behavior immediately raised Shuaib’s suspicion. “I mentioned them to Asim Suhial, the Foreign Ministry representative,” he says. “I warned him that they didn’t act like journalists, who would normally introduce themselves and try to find out what is going on. ‘A lot of people come here as journalists,’ I told him. ‘But they may not be journalists.’ I don’t know if Asim ever talked to them. He was killed with Massoud.”
The death of the charismatic leader resonated throughout the region, where some saw him as Afghanistan’s last hope against tyranny. “I was extremely upset,” Shuaib says. “I couldn’t believe Massoud was gone. For two weeks I couldn’t go to work. I couldn’t even leave the house.”
Many connect Massoud’s assassination with the terrorism waged against the United States by bin Laden’s Al Queda network on September 11. As the U.S. solidifies a coalition of nations—including Pakistan—to bring the terrorists to justice and remove their Taliban protectors, Shuaib expresses apprehension. “The United States should not trust Pakistan,”he declares. “They say one thing and do something else. Osama bin Laden had a very close relationship with their government intelligence and may still have terrorist training bases there, particularly in Peshawar and Quetta. If he’s not in Afghanistan, he may be hiding somewhere in Pakistan. And if he’s not there, Pakistan’s military intelligence definitely know where he is.”
Back home in the United States with his wife and four children, Shuaib keeps Afghanistan close to his heart. “The Afghan people have suffered through years of war, and the whole country has been devastated because of it,” he says. “I hope the international war against the Taliban and terrorism will end their suffering and that peace and a normal life come quickly for them.”
by Cassandra Franklin-Barbajosa
Photographs by Michael Yamashita
Ahmad Shah Massoud was a world class leader and an excellent commander. The man was loved and respected by his people.
We thank Allah for such a precious gift he had blessed us with, and we shall behold his legend dear to us until the end of time.
On September 9th, Commander Massoud was severely injured in a suicide bombing carried out by two Arab terrorists posing as journalists. After a few days in comma, on September 14th, 2001, at age 48, dear Massoud reached martyrdom.
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